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ABSTRACT 
In order to understand variation in post-transition levels of democracy, this thesis 
undertakes a comparative case study of Mali and Niger.  Despite similarities, Mali had 
substantially more success with democratization than Niger.  This thesis employs a 
detailed process tracing of the decisions of political and civil society leaders in Mali and 
Niger at critical junctures when democratic institutions were put to the test to evaluate the 
empirical validity of existing explanations.  It seeks to validate (or invalidate) the causal 
mechanisms linking political culture and democratic success.   
The evidence however, suggests something different.  There is a remarkable 
parallel in the behavior of political and civil actors in the two countries, which invalidates 
the hypotheses.  The most likely alternative explanation is the role of key individuals.  
The analysis indicates that “good guys” in Mali may have had a part in encouraging the 
forthright application of the rule of law, as they accepted rulings that ran counter to their 
agendas, whereas “bad guys” in Niger who, to varying degrees, engaged in actions that 
were arguably illegal, as they ran counter to the respective Niger constitutions, may have 
had a part in encouraging the abandonment of the rule of law. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
The Third Wave of democratization crested over West Africa in the early 1990s, 
displacing single party and military regimes.   By 2000, the tide had receded, revealing 
electoral regimes in which one-party politics and big-man rule remained largely intact 
behind thin veils of “democratic” trappings.  According to Freedom House, as of 2010, 
only four West African countries are considered “free,” nine are rated as “partly free” and 
three are “not free.”1   In order to understand this variation in post-transition levels of 
democracy, this thesis will undertake a comparative case study of Mali and Niger.  The 
two countries have similar French colonial experience and inheritance, both endured 
decades of military rule, and both faced internal rebellions in the early 1990s.  In 
addition, they are both land-locked Sahelian countries that are sparsely populated, with 
capitals that are physically and culturally isolated from significant segments of their 
populations.  Despite these similarities, Mali has had substantially more success with 
democratization than Niger.  Why, then, has Mali been more successful than Niger in 
maintaining this upward democratic trajectory?  
B. IMPORTANCE 
The thesis has both academic and policy importance.  It will contribute to our 
understanding of the divergence in democratic success in Africa, and Sahelian West 
Africa in particular.  This understanding is important to U.S. policymakers on two 
accounts.  According to National Security Strategy of 2006, the United States must 
“expand the circle of development by opening societies and building the infrastructure of 
democracy.”2  Thus, it is critical that U.S. policy makers have the most comprehensive 
understanding of how and why democracy takes root or fails to thrive.  In addition, the 
United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM) values the importance of West Africa 
 
1 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2010, http://freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=15 
(accessed November 25, 2010). 
2 George Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (March 2006): 1. 
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regional stability.3  As original members of the Pan-Sahel Initiative/Trans-Saharan 
Counterterrorism Initiative/Trans Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership, Mali and Niger 
assume a critical role in this, since political stability and regional security are inextricably 
linked.  Furthermore, as military partners it is of significant worth to policy makers to 
understand the shades of difference between Mali and Niger.   
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
While a substantial body of literature exists concerning general themes of 
democratization in Africa, it generally cannot account for why Mali has been more 
successful in maintaining an upward trajectory than Niger.   This corpus of literature is 
divided into three camps.  The first is economic as represented by Barro, who explores 
the positive interplay of per capita gross domestic product (GDP), primary schooling, and 
a smaller gap between male and female primary attainment, and contrasts it with the 
negative effects of urbanization and with a greater reliance on natural resources.4  The 
second camp is political.  Bratton and van de Walle argue that the institutional 
characteristics of neopatrimonial rule and pre-transition varieties of it influence the 
transition to democracy.5  Diamond suggests that democracy is more likely to be 
consolidated in the presence of credible and effective institutions.6   Ihonvbere maintains 
that neo-colonial state structures are an obstacle to democratization.7   Sandbrook 
maintains that effective political parties and independent mass media are a necessary 
 
3 Statement of General William E. Ward, USA Commander, United States Africa Command before the 
Senate Armed Services Committee and House Armed Services Committee on 17–18 March 2009, United 
States Africa Command: 2009 Posture Statement (March 2009): 23–25.  
4 Robert J. Barro, “Determinants of Democracy,” The Journal of Political Economy 107 (December 
1999): S158–S183; Larry Sirowy and Alex Inkeles, "The Effects of Democracy on Economic Growth and 
Inequality: A Review." Studies Comparative Internat. Development 25 (Spring 1990): 126–57; and Adam 
Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, "Political Regimes and Economic Growth." Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 7 (Summer 1993): 51–69. 
5 Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle, Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions 
in Comparative Perspective (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997). 
6 Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1999). 
7 Julius O. Ihonvbere, “Where Is the Third Wave? A Critical Evaluation of Africa's Non-Transition to 
Democracy,” Africa Today 43 (October–December 1996): 343–367. 
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condition for democratic consolidation.8  Neither of these camps can account for the 
divergent outcomes in Mali and Niger, which have similar values on all of the 
independent variables identified.  
The third camp explores the relationship between social capital and democracy.  
In his groundbreaking 1993 studying of social capital in Italy, Putnam concludes that 
cross-cutting networks encourage wider cooperation, reinforce trust, and build both a 
strong economy and democratic society.9  Writing several years later, in the wake of an 
outpouring of research on social capital and democracy, Newton acknowledges some 
relationship between social trust and social capital, and between political trust and 
political capital, but argues that the relationship is much more complex and nuanced than 
most theorists were suggesting, and that more research needs to be done before the 
prevailing theories can be fully accepted.10 Paxton takes up this challenge in her 
quantitative global study, finding that there is a reciprocal relationship between social 
capital and democracy, and “that associations that are connected to the larger community 
have a positive effect on democracy, while isolated associations have a negative 
effect.”11  Varshney finds that participation in intercommunal (Hindu and Muslim) 
associations in India mitigates intercommunal violence,12 while Maclean finds the 
opposite in her study of Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire.  She argues that passive membership in 
heterogeneous associations hinders interethnic cooperation in Côte d’Ivoire, while more 
active participation in relatively homogenous associations in Ghana facilitates interethnic 
 
8 Richard Sandbrook, “Transitions without Consolidation: Democratization in Six African Cases,” 
Third World Quarterly 17 (March 1996): 69–87. 
9 Robert Putnam, Making Democracy Work: civic traditions in modern Italy. (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1993). 
10 When Newton wrote, the latest theories argued “that trust has its origins in that broad, deep, and 
dense network of voluntary associations and intermediary organizations that comprise civil society. Trust is 
a – probably the – main component of social capital, and social capital is a necessary condition of social 
integration, economic efficiency, and democratic stability” Kenneth Newton, “Trust, Social Capital, Civil 
Society, and Democracy,” International Political Science Review 22 (2001): 201–214; Kenneth Newton, 
“Social Capital and Democracy,”  The American Behavioral Scientist 40 (March/April 1997): 575–586. 
11 Pamela Paxton, “Social Capital and Democracy: An Interdependent Relationship,” American 
Sociological Review 67 (April 2002): 254–277. 
12 Ashutosh Varshney, Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India. (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2002). 
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cooperation and the development of “more democratic values and practices.”13  The 
arguments in this camp tend to resonate with the literature on Mali and Niger.  
Most of the case specific literature attributes Mali’s success to “unique political 
culture” or the role of key leaders in the democratization process.  While citing political 
and economic reforms and external support, Baudais and Sborgi clearly emphasize the 
role of Amadou Toumani Toure´ in Mali’s early success.14  Likewise, Smith attributes 
Mali’s success to economic growth, social structures conducive to equality, a favorable 
international environment, effective political leadership, and a unique political culture 
emerging from the national founding epic of Mali, again giving priority to leadership 
personalities and culture.15  In a similar theme, Pringle credits Mali’s democratization to 
a heritage of tolerance and tradition of decentralized government with roots in the Ghana 
Empire (eighth to eleventh centuries), Mali Empire (twelfth to fifteenth centuries), and 
Songhai Empire (fourteenth to sixteenth centuries).16   This argument is consistent with 
Putnam’s findings that different levels of social capital in contemporary northern and 
southern Italy are traceable to networks of association membership rooted in the distant 
past.  Vanhanen also attributes Mali’s success to both its “unique political culture” and 
the leadership of President Alpha Oumar Konare.17  Only Vengroff departs from the 
unique political culture argument, stressing instead the effect of electoral systems, 
arguing that Mali’s majoritarian system helped ensure a clear winner took power as 
opposed to a potentially fractious coalition government.18  Those who have written on 
Niger’s fleeting success also generally ascribe it to the role of individuals.  Davis and 
 
13 Lauren Morris MacLean, “Mediating ethnic conflicr at the grassroots: the role of local associational 
life in shaping political values in Co^te d’Ivoire and Ghana,” Journal of Modern African Studies 42 (2004): 
589–617. 
14 Virginie Baudais and Enrico Sborgi, “The presidential and parliamentary elections in Mali, April 
and July 2007,” Electoral Studies 27 (2008): 740–773. 
15 Zeric Kay Smith, “Mali’s Decade of Democracy,” Journal of Democracy 12 (July 2001): 73–79. 
16 Robert Pringle, “Democratization in Mali: Putting History to Work,” United States Institute of 
Peace, Peaceworks No. 58, (October 2006). 
17 Tatu Vanhanen, “Struggle for Democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa,” Acta Politica 39 (2004): 207–
247. 
18 Richard Vengroff, “The Impact of the Electoral System on the Transition to Democracy in Africa: 
The Case of Mali,” Electoral Studies 13 (1994): 29–37. 
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Kossomi attribute Niger’s success in the early 2000s to significant political actors who 
believed in the moral superiority of a democratic regime.19  Baudais and Sborgi see 
Niger’s democratic advances in the early 2000s as a result of rational choice taken by 
Nigerien voters and politicians alike.20  There have been no efforts to explain Niger’s 
more generalized lack of success.   
Moestrup, author of the only comparative analysis of Mali and Niger, follows 
Vengroff in attributing their divergent outcomes to different electoral systems 
(majoritarian in Mali, proportional representation in Niger) and the interaction of key 
leaders, notably the inclusion of the military in Mali and the exclusion of the military in 
Niger from the transition process.21  However, like the scholars discussed above, 
Moestrup gives greatest emphasis to individual leaders.  The argument about electoral 
systems is persuasive for the initial push toward democracy, but cannot explain why Mali 
was able to stay the course and Niger was not at various critical junctures where the 
electoral system was not a part of the problem or solution.  In addition, Moestrup’s 
research took place more than a decade ago, before either country had really embarked on 
democratic consolidation.   
The consensus in the case study literature about the role of culture in shaping 
individual decisions that in turn affected the sustainability of democracy is plausible but 
lacks adequate empirical support. Thus, this thesis undertakes a more detailed process 
tracing of the decisions of political and civil society leaders at critical junctures when 
democratic institutions were put to the test to determine the empirical validity of existing 
arguments.  It does not seek to uncover the historical roots of social capital, but rather 
seeks to validate (or invalidate) the causal mechanisms linking political culture and 
democratic success in the last two decades. 
 
19 John Uniack Davis and Aboubacar B. Kossomi, “Niger Gets Back on Track,” Journal of 
Democracy Volume 12 (July 2001): 80–87. 
20 Virginie Baudais and Enrico Sborgi, “The general elections in Niger, November 2004,” Electoral 
Studies 25 (2006): 147–191. 
21 Sophia Moestrup, “The Role of Actors and Institutions:  the Difficulties of Democratic Survival in 
Mali and Niger,” Democratization 6, (Summer 1999): 171–186. 
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D. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
The hypothesis of this paper is that social capital, the independent variable (IV), 
explains the divergent outcomes in democratic consolidation, the dependent variable 
(DV).  “Social capital refers to connections among individuals—social networks and the 
norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them. In that sense social capital 
is closely related to what some have called ‘civic virtue.’” 22  Two separate causal 
pathways are identified.  The first hypothesis of this thesis is that higher levels of social 
capital produced a greater inclination among Malian political actors and parties to adhere 
to the rule of law, engage in consensus politics, and accept rulings of the constitutional 
courts, the intervening variable one (IntV1), which contributed to democratic survival 
and consolidation.  The second hypothesis is that higher levels of social capital produced 
a greater inclination among Malian civil society organizations to engage elected 
governments within the limits of the law and accept its decisions even when they were 
not those sought by civic activism, the intervening variable two  (IntV2), which also 
contributed to democratic survival and consolidation.   
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
As noted above, Mali and Niger are ideally suited for Mill’s Method of Difference 
because they are very similar Sahelian countries.  They are sparsely populated, have 
similar population demographics, underwent their initial transitions to democracy in the 
early 1990s, are poor, have capitals that are physically and culturally distant from the rest 
of their landmass, and inherited French systems of government.  Economic indicators are 
also similar (Table 1).  
 
22 Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The collapse and revival of American community (New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 2000), 19. 
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Mali 12.3 3 196 54 560 52 1.5 1,017 
Niger 14.2 3.3 176 57 280 40 0.8 542 
Source: The World Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI) database, based on 2007 data.  
http://go.worldbank.org/1SF48T40L0 (accessed March 14, 2010). 
 
 
The critical junctures that will be compared are: (1) The behavior of Islamic civic 
organizations and leaders and (2) The behavior of political parties and government 
officials with respect to the rule of law during Malian election disputes in 1997 and 2007, 
and Nigerien political crises in 1995–1996 and 2009–2010.  It is anticipated that higher 
levels of social capital in Mali will have set the conditions for a an active civil society 
that works within the framework of legality to effect change, and respect for rule of law 
by both the ruling party and political opposition that keeps electoral disputes and political 
crises from escalating to the point of illegally threatening the regime.  If social capital is 
indeed lower in Niger, one should see a less active and/or less rule-bound civil society, 
and less respect for the rule of law among political actors, leading to more escalation of 
electoral disputes and political crises.   
The level of social capital is inferred from the intervening variables.  The rule of 
law is measured by the extent to which the decisions of the constitutional courts are 
independent and respected by both those in power and the opposition.  Civil society 
behavior is measured by the extent to which contesting civic organizations adhere to the 
rule of law, even when doing so runs counter to their interests.  The dependent variable of 
democratic consolidation is evaluated by the extent to which each country is considered 
free using the Freedom House index.  The divergent outcome of political rights and civil 




                                                
where it was downgraded to “partly free,” has been considered free for almost two 
decades.  Niger, on the other hand, has been classified as “partly free” since 1991 and 
was even downgraded to “not free” from 1996–1998.23 
The civil society chapter is largely dependent on two secondary sources Benjamin 
F. Soares’ analysis of Mali and Robert Charlick’s analysis of Niger.24  However, the 
dependent variable in both analyses is the rise in Islamic fundamentalism.  This theses 
uses evidence on Islamic activism provide by these authors to evaluate the behavior of 
civil society and its effect on democratic consolidation.   
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The thesis is organized into four chapters: an introduction, two case study 
chapters exploring each of the intervening variables, and conclusion chapter.   
 
23 Freedom House, “Comparative and Historical Data,” 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=439 (accessed November 25, 2010). 
24 Benjamin F. Soares, “Islam in Mali in the Neoliberal Era,” African Affairs 105 (December 2005): 
77–95; Robert B. Charlick, “Niger: Islamist Identity and the Politics of Globalization,” in William F.S. 
Miles, ed., Political Islam in West Africa: State-Society Relations Transformed (New Delhi: Viva Books 
Private Limited, 2007), 19–42; Robert B. Charlick, “African Studies Review Focus: Islamism in West 
Africa,” African Studies Review 47 (September 2004): 97–107. 
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II. RULE OF LAW 
Rule of law “implies that government authority may only be exercised in 
accordance with written laws [and court rulings], which were adopted through an 
established procedure. The principle is intended to be a safeguard against arbitrary 
rulings in individual cases.”25  Respect for the rule of law among political actors in Mali 
and Niger will be evaluated by their engagement in consensus politics, and their 
acceptance of the rulings of the constitutional courts.  The case study of Mali focuses on 
the behavior of political parties and government officials during election dispute in 1997.  
The case study of Niger focuses on the behavior of political parties and government 
officials during the political crises of 1995–1996 and 2009–2010.  The comparative 
analysis looks for how differences in the level of respect for the rule of law contributed to 
democratic survival and consolidation. 
A. MALI 
Mali’s transition from a single-party state to multiparty democracy was initiated 
by a March 1991 military coup by Colonel Amadou Toumani Touré. Touré’s Comité de 
Transition pour le Salut du Peuple (CTSP) oversaw elections in February and March 
1992, and handed power to the newly elected government.  The Alliance pour la 
Démocratie en Mali (ADEMA) won 76 of 116 legislative seats, and its presidential 
candidate, Alpha Oumar Konaré, won with 69.01 percent of the vote. 26  Within a few 
years, however, the regime was suffering from internal discord.  In 1994, six ADEMA 
deputies, critical of the pace of anti-corruption reform, broke away to form the 
Mouvement pour l'Indépendance, la Renaissance et l'Intégration Africaine (MIRIA).  
Also in 1994, the government was rocked by student strikes demanding compensation for 
their role in the 1992 regime transition, and strikes by teachers and industrial workers 
 
25 “Rule of law – Definition.” WordIQ.Com, http://www.wordiq.com/definition/Rule_of_law  
(accessed March 12, 2010). 
26 Albert C. Nunley, African Elections Database, “Elections in Mali,” 
http://africanelections.tripod.com/ml.html#2002 _National_Assembly_Election (accessed March 11, 2010). 
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seeking wage increases to offset a 50 percent currency devaluation.27  As the country 
headed into the 1997 elections, ADEMA’s honeymoon was long since over. 
The adoption of a new electoral code in January 1997 set the stage for the 
regime’s first political crisis. The new electoral code raised the number of National 
Assembly seats from 116 to 147 and required that the elections for these newly created 
seats be conducted before June 8, 1997.28   The Commission Electorale Nationale 
Indépendante (CENI) appealed to the government and all political parties to come to 
general consensus on the election date, which should be in mid- to late-April.  On March 
3, President Konaré met with all thirteen parties represented in the National Assembly to 
discuss the election date.  He suggested April 13 or 27, and the opposition parties 
supported the later date.  While the meeting did not produce a definite agreement on the 
date, all parties were supportive of the process and agreed that it was imperative to 
support CENI, given the short time horizon regardless of which date was chosen.29  On 
March 4, Konaré dissolved the National Assembly in anticipation of the legislative 
elections, which had to be held 21 to 40 days following dissolution according to the 
constitution.30  A few days later, Konaré set the April 13 date.  While the opposition 
lacked legal grounds to protest the April 13 date, it was dismayed that the earlier date was 
chosen as they were afforded less time to prepare for the election, and as such felt the 
conditions were unfavorable for their bid for political gain.31 
 
27 Smith, 74–75. 
28 Inter-Parliamentary Union, “Mali: Parliamentary Chamber,” http://www.ipu.org/parline-
e/reports/arc/2201_97.htm (accessed October 5, 2010); RTM radio (Mali), “President Konare confirms 
elections, rules out transitional government,” February 21, 1997, through BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, February 24, 1997,  http://w3.nexis.com/new/ (accessed October 5, 2010). 
29 RTM radio (Mali), “President, political parties try to reach agreement on new election timetable,” 
March 3, 1997, through BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, March 5, 1997,  http://w3.nexis.com/new/ 
(accessed March 11, 2010) 
30 RTM radio (Mali), “President dissolves National Assembly in preparation for elections,” March 4, 
1997, through BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, March 5, 1997, http://w3.nexis.com/new/ (accessed 
October 5, 2010). 
31 Radio France Internationale, “Commission chairman rejects opposition criticism of 13th April 
elections,” April 7, 1997, through BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, April 10, 1997, 
http://w3.nexis.com/new/ (accessed March 11, 2010) 
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The opposition was critical of preparations for the elections, including the manner 
in which electoral materials were distributed and voter registration was being conducted, 
despite a report from CENI that pre-election arrangements were going well.32  When 
early results showed ADEMA and its allies winning the first round, all thirteen 
opposition parties contested the results, and threatened to boycott the second round of the 
legislative elections and the upcoming May presidential election unless the government 
invalidated the results, dissolved CENI, and resigned.33   Iba Ndiaya, Secretary-General 
of ADEMA, responded: “we do not have the power to annul the elections, the ADEMA, 
the government and the president of the republic do not have it. Constitutionally, this 
power lies with the Constitutional Court.  If a president of the republic substitutes himself 
for an institution, such an act is called dictatorship. It would be an abuse of power.”34  
President Konaré acknowledged “shortcomings” in the running of the elections, and 
urged complainants to pursue their grievances through the legal system, effectively 
submitting himself and his party to the rule of law.35  In accordance with Article 86, the 
Constitutional Court took the issue under review.   
On April 25, twelve days after the election and eight days after the review was 
initiated, the Constitutional Court cancelled the elections on account of irregularities, and 
called for new elections.36  This judgment in favor of the opposition demonstrated the 
independence of the courts and the acceptance of its ruling by ADEMA, demonstrated 
respect for the rule of law.   The opposition, which had won the case, was still not 
satisfied because the government had neither dissolved CENI nor resigned, as it 
 
32 Radio France Internationale, “Commission chairman rejects opposition criticism of 13th April 
elections.”  
33 Mali uses a two-round system, in which the two highest vote receiving candidates engage in a run-
off if the top vote winner does not achieve a majority in the first round. Africa No 1 radio (Gabon), 
“Opposition calls for cancellation of election results,” April15, 1997, through BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, April 17, 1997, http://w3.nexis.com/new/ (accessed March 11, 2010); RTM radio (Mali), 
“Ruling party official, opposition on "agreement" to annul election results.” 
34 RTM radio (Mali), “Ruling party official, opposition on "agreement" to annul election results,” 
April 22, 1997, through BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, April 24, 1997, http://w3.nexis.com/new/ 
(accessed March 11, 2010) 
35 RTM radio (Mali), “President Konare calls for greater tolerance from political parties,” April 18, 
1997, through BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, April 21, 1997, http://w3.nexis.com/new/ (accessed 
March 11, 2010) 
36 Nunley, African Elections Database, “Elections in Mali.” 
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demanded.  Konaré offered a number of conciliatory measures, including dialogue with 
the opposition, a program for a broad-based government, and pardoning of opposition 
activists sentenced for electoral offences.  Still, the opposition embarked on various 
marches to “demonstrate the general discontent,” made public statements declaring that 
the government lacked “legal authority,” and some of the smaller parties categorically 
refused to participate in dialogue with the president.37   
In the end, one minor opposition leader, Mamadou Maribatrou Diaby, from the 
Parti pour l'Unité, la Démocratie et le Progrès (PUDP) ran against Konaré in the May 11 
presidential election, receiving 4.1 percent of the vote.38 Eight parties, including 
ADEMA and its two allies Parti pour la Renaissance Nationale (PARENA) and Parti 
Démocratique pour la Justice (PDJ), ran in the new National Assembly elections, which 
took place July 30 (first round) and August 3 (second round), while seven opposition 
parties, including the three main ones, boycotted.39  In January 1998, the opposition 
again refused to take part in a national forum called by the government to discuss the 
country’s political issues.  Despite many conciliatory efforts, Konaré never won the 
opposition over.  It returned to participating in democratic processes after he was term 
 
37 Africa No 1 radio (Gabon), “Opposition leader discusses planned election boycott,” May 5, 1997, 
through BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, May 7, 1997,  http://w3.nexis.com/new/ (accessed March 11, 
2010); Radio France Internationale, “Opposition CNID official says president has no "legal authority" to 
rule,” May 12, 1997, through BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, May 14, 1997,  
http://w3.nexis.com/new/ (accessed March 11, 2010); RTM radio (Mali), “President begins talks with 
political parties,” August 8, 1997, through BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, August 11, 1997,  
http://w3.nexis.com/new/ (accessed March 11, 2010);  RTM radio (Mali), “President Konare presents 
programme for broad-based government,” September 8, 1997, through BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, September 11, 1997,  http://w3.nexis.com/new/ (accessed March 11, 2010); RTM radio (Mali), 
“President pardons 26 opposition activists,” October 22 1997, through BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, October 24, 1997,  http://w3.nexis.com/new/ (accessed March 11, 2010); Africa No 1 radio 
(Gabon), “Opposition leader says march in Bamako a "warning",” December 29, 1997, through BBC 
Summary of World Broadcasts, December 31, 1997,  http://w3.nexis.com/new/ (accessed March 11, 2010); 
Moestrup, 180–181. 
38 Nunley, African Elections Database, “Elections in Mali.” 
39 Nunley, African Elections Database, “Elections in Mali.” Those opposition parties that participated 
where the CDS – 4 seats, Union pour la Démocratie et le Développement (UDD) – 2 seats, Parti pour la 
Démocratie et le Progrès (PDP) – 2 seats, Convention pour le Progrès et le peuple (COPP) – 1 seat, and 
Rassemblement National pour la Démocratie (RND) – 1 seat.  Those who boycotted where Boycotted by 
the following main opposition parties: Congrès national d’Initiative Démocratique (CNID), Union 
Soudanaise-Rassemblement Démocratique Africain  (US-RDA), Mouvement Populaire pour le 
Développement de la République de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (MPD), RDP, Rassemblement pour la Démocratie 
et du Travail (RDT), Union des forces Démocratiques pour le Progrès (UFDP), and the Union Malienne 
pour la Démocratie et le Développement (UMDD).  
 13
litical arena.41    
                                                
limited out.  During the April/May 2002 presidential elections, there were twenty-four 
candidates, representing at least fourteen political parties, who ran for president.  The 
presidency was won Amadou Toumani Touré (ATT), who ran as a non-aligned 
candidate.  Upon his election, he built an “oversized coalition” that included all major 
political parties along with independents.40  With former opposition members 
incorporated into the government; the creditability of the regime seemed to be restored 
and the National Assembly elections in July of the same year brought the opposition back 
into the po
The rule of law was generally respected throughout this crisis.  Most importantly, 
the court was used as designed and all sides accepted the court’s ruling as binding.  The 
decision of the opposition to boycott elections and reconciliation in an attempt to 
delegitimize the government is less favorable for acknowledgement of the rule of law.   
While on one hand boycotting the political process as a means to express their grievances 
with the system is a lawful technique, the fact that they did so as a result of all their 
demands not being met complicates the issue.  The opposition boycott was driven by the 
refusal of the government to resign and dissolve CENI, which it did not have the legal 
authority to demand.  Thus, as an opposition they only seemed to play the political game 
on their terms or not at all.  As for democratic consolidation, while the rule of law was 
upheld and the courts respected as institutions, Freedom House’s evaluation of Mali was 
marked by a drop in scores for 1997.   In 1996, Mali was categorized as “free” with a 
score of “2” in political rights (PR) and “2” in civil liberties (CL), in 1997 through 2000, 
 
40 Baudais and Sborgi, “The presidential and parliamentary elections in Mali, April and July 2007,” 
769–770. 
41 Nunley, African Elections Database, “Elections in Mali.”  The majority, who were aligned with 
ATT, contained four parties grouped under the banner of Espoir 2002 (Hope 2002), and the opposition 
consisted of ADEMA and unnamed ‘others’ under the banner Alliance pour la République et la démocratie 
(ARD), additionally there were two other parties and several independents not aligned to either Espoir 
2002 or ARD.  
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both of these scores were downgraded to “3.”42  This scoring indicates that despite the 
noted successes of the institutions of law, democratic consolidation was negative during 
this period in Mali. 
B. NIGER 
Niger held its first multi-party legislative and presidential elections in February 
and March of 1993.  Mahamane Ousmane of the Convention Démocratique et Sociale 
(CDS) won the presidency and a presidential-allied coalition under the banner Alliance 
des Forces du Changement (AFC), in which the CDS was the dominant party, took 50 of 
the 83 seats in the National Assembly.   Mahamadou Issoufou of the Parti Nigerien pour 
la Democratie et le Socialisme (PNDS), also a member of the AFC, was appointed prime 
minister. Like Mali, Niger faced a host of economic problems: public spending was 
double the state’s revenue in 1993, and labor unions demanded significant salary 
increases to compensate for the currency devaluation of January 1994.   
Niger’s semi-presidential regime, in which the division of power between 
president and prime minister was unclear, led to a contest for power between the two.  
This power struggle led to standoffs over policy and the distribution of political 
appointments within the ruling coalition and ultimately to political crisis.  While 
Ousmane attempted to expand his powers, by pushing the boundaries of the law, he 
accepted the constraints imposed by democratic procedures, including parliamentary no-




42 Freedom House, “Comparative and Historical Data”;  “Political rights enable people to participate 
freely in the political process, including the right to vote freely for distinct alternatives in legitimate 
elections, compete for public office, join political parties and organizations, and elect representatives who 
have a decisive impact on public policies and are accountable to the electorate. Civil liberties allow for the 
freedoms of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal 
autonomy without interference from the state… In addition, each country and territory is assigned a 
numerical rating—on a scale of 1 to 7—for political rights and an analogous rating for civil liberties; a 
rating of 1 indicates the highest degree of freedom and 7 the lowest level of freedom.”  Freedom House, 
Freedom in the World 2010. 
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In September, the PNDS complained that it did not receive the promised quota of 
directorships over government departments and parastatals.43   The president responded 
in September by issuing a decree, which was outside his prerogative, that transferred 
control of the Cabinet Office, sections of the police and security forces, the Secretariat of 
the Council of Ministers, State Protocol, and the State Inspectorate Division from the 
office of the prime minister to the office of the president, effectively emasculating the 
Office of the Prime Minister.44  Issoufou resigned as prime minister later that month, 
taking the PNDS out of the governing coalition and allying instead with the opposition 
Mouvement National pour la Societé du Développement (MNSD).  This left Ousmane’s 
AFC in the minority.45  Ousmane appointed a close confidant, Souley Abdulaye (CDS), 
as prime minister.  Abdulaye was removed through a parliamentary vote of no-
confidence eleven days later.  Ousmane dissolved the National Assembly in November 
and called new legislative elections for January 1995.46  His coalition failed to regain 
control of the National Assembly in free and fair elections, officially initiating a period of 
cohabitation.47   Interestingly, Ousmane continued to jockey for control of the regime, 
often using questionable means to do so, either be scaling down the powers of the prime 
minister or controlling who occupied the post of prime minister through personal 
dealings. Despite the dubious nature of his gambits, he accepted and continued to accept 
the institutional rulings that curtailed his initiatives. 
Ousmane rejected the MNSD’s candidate for Prime Minister, Hama Amadou, on 
the grounds that the parliamentary majority was required to submit three nominations, 
 
43 Jibrin Ibrahim and Abdoulaye Niandou Souley, “The rise to power of an opposition party the 
MNSD in Niger Republic,” University of South Africa Press, http://www.unisa.ac.za/default.asp? 
Cmd=ViewContent& ContentID=11625 (accessed December 15, 2009). 
44 Ibrahim and Souley, “The rise to power of an opposition party the MNSD in Niger Republic.” 
45 Moestrup, 181; Ibrahim and Souley, “The rise to power of an opposition party the MNSD in Niger 
Republic.” 
46 Ibrahim and Souley, “The rise to power of an opposition party the MNSD in Niger Republic.” 
47 Ibrahim and Souley, “The rise to power of an opposition party the MNSD in Niger Republic”; Voix 
du Sahel (Niger), “Niger; Defeated party accepts election ruling, appeals for calm,” January 28, 1995, 
through BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, February 1, 1995, http://w3.nexis.com/new/ (accessed 
August 29, 2010). 
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and had provided only one.48  In fashion similar to Abdulaye’s appointment, that is 
appointing someone whose allegiance was secured, Ousmane appointed Amadou Cisse 
(MNSD) as prime minister.  Cisse was ejected from the MNSD (after assuming prime 
ministership without party approval) in February 1995.49  A few weeks later, the 
legislature again removed the Prime Minister in a close vote of no confidence (43 to 40) 
along party lines.50  Cisse stepped down, noting: 
[T]he political option I adopted generated a lot of misunderstandings and 
resentment, which resulted in the decision made at yesterday's National 
Assembly session at the initiative of my own political party.  So, drawing 
on the conclusions of this political ballot, I immediately asked the 
president of the republic to relieve me of my duties.51   
Ousmane ultimately conceded this round of the struggle to the legislature and appointed 
Amadou prime minister on February 28.   
Over the next year of cohabitation the president and the prime minister continued 
to vie for power.52  Ousmane maintained that the problem of cohabitation was: 
[I]nterpretation of the constitution and what this cohabitation should 
be…the prime minister thinks that cohabitation means alternative 
government, that is, a radical change, not only of all officials in 
administrative and political spheres belonging to the presidential tendency, 
but also down-grading…prerogatives of the head of state in favour of the 
new majority.53   
 
 
48 Ibrahim and Souley, “The rise to power of an opposition party the MNSD in Niger Republic.” 
49 Radio France Internationale,  “Niger; New prime minister's party reportedly expels him,” February 
8, 1995, through BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, February 9, 1995,  http://w3.nexis.com/new/ 
(accessed September 13, 2010). 
50 Radio France Internationale, “Niger; Parliamentary majority wins censure vote against prime 
minister,” February 20, 1995, through BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, February 22, 1995, 
http://w3.nexis.com/new/ (accessed September 13, 2010). 
51 Voix du Sahel (Niger), “Niger; Outgoing Prime Minister Cisse Amadou accepts dismissal, expresses 
regret,” February 21, 1995, through BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, February 23, 1995,, 
http://w3.nexis.com/new/ (accessed August 29, 2010). 
52 Davis and Kossomi, 82; Moestrup, 181. 
53 Radio France Internationale, “Niger; President Ousmane on the problems of cohabitation with his 
prime minister,” July 22, 1995, through BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, July 24, 1995, 
http://w3.nexis.com/new/ (accessed September 13, 2010). 
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For Amadou: 
[E]ach of us should have the same interpretation…of cohabitation… [T]he 
president of the republic should know exactly to what extent he should be 
involved in the management of the affairs of the state.54  
The sentiment of both Ousmane and Amadou would endure as both had differing ideas of 
cohabitation, and neither was willing to sacrifice power.  Both looked for ways to either 
assert and/or expand their powers as they competed for control over the state.  
In July, the prime minister claimed that Ousmane was categorically rejecting his 
political appointments and refusing to follow mediation procedures (despite public claims 
to the contrary).55  Furthermore, Amadou claimed Ousmane was deliberately severing 
communication and refusing to meet with him.56  Ousmane countered that the Amadou 
government was overstepping its prerogative by attempting a “radical” overhaul of the 
Niger executive to down-grade presidential authorities.57  By the end of July 1995, the 
government was in crisis: 
Who is in charge in of the meetings of the Council of Ministers? Who 
appoints state officials?  Who signs the decrees—such as this latest 
amnesty text?  Niger is in the midst of a crisis at the moment.  Behind the 
trial of strength between the president and the prime minister is a fierce 
attempt to settle accounts between the country's two main political forces: 
Mahamane Ousmane's CDS and Tandja Mamadou's MNSD, the former 
sole party.  It is a battle for jobs, for posts; the state has returned to the 
wild, says 'Le Republicain'.  If the Supreme Court does not issue a 






54 Voix du Sahel (Niger), “Niger; Prime minister says talks with president ‘beginning of an end to the 
crisis,’” July 26, 1995, through BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, July 28, 1995, 
http://w3.nexis.com/new/ (accessed August 29, 2010). 
55 Voix du Sahel (Niger), “Niger; Government issues statement on relations between president and 
prime minister,” July 6, 1995, through BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, July 8, 1995, 
http://w3.nexis.com/new/ (accessed August 29, 2010). 
56 Voix du Sahel (Niger), “Niger; Government issues statement on relations between president and 
prime minister.” 
57 Radio France Internationale, “Niger; President Ousmane on the problems of cohabitation with his 
prime minister.”  
 18
                                                
people might be tempted to use the president's special powers, or the 
prime minister's police powers.  In other words, the youthful democracy of 
Niger could come under serious threat.58 
It was at this point that Amadou too, began to push the envelope of his authorities by 
taking unilateral action when the opportunity arose. 
International mediators from Togo and Mali attempted to foster dialogue between 
the president, prime minister, and MNSD party chairman Mamadou Tandja, through a 
joint meeting between Ousmane and Amadou and a separate meeting with Tandja.59  
This dialogue did not endure beyond the sponsored meetings, and Ousmane and Amadou 
were unable to agree on what cohabitation meant in practice, both believing he was 
entitled to have more say in the happenings of the running of the state then the other 
thought he was.  In the spirit of cooperation, Ousmane issued an emotional appeal to the 
“every patriot,…all the Niger political class, socioprofessional organizations and the civil 
society in its entirety” to work together to build a republican pact and find a solution to 
the crisis.60  In early August Amadou published a decree removing nineteen heads of 
state companies appointed by Ousmane, reinvigorating the political crisis.61  Amadou 
held a cabinet meeting in which he tried to redefine powers, without Ousmane, to deal 
with appointments and three bills, which set up a national ombudsman’s office and 
detailed the respective prerogatives of the President and Prime Minister.  After the fact, 
Amadou maintained that Ousmane refused to take the chair, and since the constitution did 
not provide guidance for such a situation he chaired the meeting himself.  Ousmane 
contended that he never refused to chair the meeting and declared the decisions taken at 
 
58 Radio France Internationale, “Trial of strength between president and PM said to threaten Niger's 
democracy,” July 15, 1995, through BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, July 18, 1995, 
http://w3.nexis.com/new/ (accessed August 29, 2010). 
59 Africa No 1 radio (Gabon), “Niger; Togo offers to mediate between president and prime minister,” 
July 18, 1995, through BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, July 20, 1995, http://w3.nexis.com/new/ 
(accessed August 29, 2010). 
60 Voix du Sahel (Niger), “Niger; President Ousmane calls for "republican pact" to end political 
crisis,’” August 2, 1995, through BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, August 3, 1995, 
http://w3.nexis.com/new/ (accessed August 29, 2010). 
61 Radio France Internationale, “Niger; Prime minister publishes decree dismissing 19 heads of public 
companies,’” August 1, 1995, through BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, August 3, 1995, 
http://w3.nexis.com/new/ (accessed August 29, 2010). 
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the cabinet meeting “null and void.”62  Amadou’s dismissals were immediately overruled 
by a Niamey county court, whose ruling was upheld by the Supreme Court in September.  
The Supreme Court also overturned the president’s nullification of the bills approved at 
Amadou’s cabinet meeting.63  Amadou accepted the court’s ruling, saying that the 
appointments in question should be resubmitted according to the procedures set forth in 
Article 58 of the Constitution.64  Thus, both Ousmane and Amadou continued to joust for 
power, within the letter of the law as interpreted by the rulings of the judiciary. 
The struggle for power continued.  In October, opposition MPs failed to pass a 
motion of no-confidence.  In November a small opposition party criticized the Amadou 
government for suppressing freedom of expression and violating laws, causing a systemic 
failure of Niger’s democracy.65  Ousmane appeared poised to dissolve parliament as soon 
as constitutionally allowable (12 months after the last election) in the hope of winning a 
legislative majority in new elections.  It was at this point in the crisis that the institutions 
of democracy came under greatest threat as Amadou was threatening to supersede the 
lines of constitutionality.  Amadou announced that if parliament was dissolved he would 
insist on staying in office until new elections were held.  On January 26, 1996, President 
of the National Assembly Issoufou, an ally of Amadou, made a formal request to the 
Supreme Court to remove Ousmane on the grounds of incapacity to govern.66  Still on 
the positive, members of the opposition and Ousmane, did not completely discard the 
institutions of democracy and employed them (no-confidence votes, arbitrating 
 
62 Africa No1 radio (Gabon), “Niger; Crisis between president and prime minister deepens,’” August 
4, 1995, through BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, August 7, 1995, http://w3.nexis.com/new/ (accessed 
August 29, 2010). 
63 Voix du Sahel (Niger), “Niger; Supreme Court overrules president, sides with National Assembly,” 
September 6, 1995, through BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, September 8, 1995, 
http://w3.nexis.com/new/ (accessed September 13, 2010). 
64 Voix du Sahel (Niger), “Niger; Court reinstates heads of public companies dismissed by prime 
minister,” August 1, 1995, through BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, August 8, 1995, 
http://w3.nexis.com/new/ (accessed September 13, 2010); Voix du Sahel (Niger), “Niger; Government 
annuls prime minister's appointments of senior officials,” September 11, 1995, through BBC Summary of 
World Broadcasts, September 13, 1995, http://w3.nexis.com/new/ (accessed September 13, 2010). 
65 Voix du Sahel (Niger), “Niger; Party criticizes what it calls prime minister's violation of 
democracy,” November 9, 1995, through BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, November 10, 1995, 
http://w3.nexis.com/new/ (accessed September 13, 2010). 
66 Ibrahim and Souley, “The rise to power of an opposition party the MNSD in Niger Republic.” 
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complaints through the courts, and using constitutionally afforded powers) as they 
engaged in political maneuvering.  Nevertheless, the threat of transgressing these same 
institutions appeared very real as both actors pushed the boundaries when an opportunity 
was afforded to them.  Whether they would have continued to push further is 
unknowable, because on February 18, the military assumed power and suspended the 
constitution. 
The new Salvation Council Chairman Chief of Staff Colonel Mainassara justified 
the coup in these terms:   
The armed forces of Niger, by intervening in the national political life on 
27th January 1996, had no intention of putting an end to the ongoing 
democratic process, but to save the nation from the danger of deterioration 
that was threatening our country due to the crisis raging at the highest 
level of the state.67 
The Salvation Council cited ripple effects of the nearly yearlong political 
deadlock: stagnation of “the nation's economic life…the crisis within the abandoned 
Niger schools, the social problems experienced by state agents due to the non-payment of 
salaries, sanitation problems, the famine looming on the horizon, and the politicization of 
the administration.”68  The political crisis, to the relief of the Nigerien populace, had 
been forcibly resolve
The rule of law was respected to the extent that the operations of democratic 
institutions were generally respected throughout the crisis—electoral outcomes and court 
decisions were accepted by both sides.  However, Ousmane and Amadou certainly 
pushed the envelope on their authorities when grey areas of the law gave them the 
opportunity to do so—issuing unilateral decrees and interpreted the constitution through a 
lens of self-interest.  So while the political actors certainly took advantage of 
opportunities to circumvent the law, they ultimately maneuvered within the clearly 
 
67 Voix du Sahel (Niger), “Salvation council chairman addresses nation on reasons for coup,” January 
29, 1996, through BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, January 31, 1996, http://w3.nexis.com/new/ 
(accessed August 29, 2010). 
68 Voix du Sahel (Niger), “Salvation council chairman addresses nation on reasons for coup.” 
69 Moestrup, 181. 
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established components of the Niger democracy, because when the court ruled against 
these actions and the national votes were called, the outcomes were respected.   With 
regard to democratic consolidation, Freedom House’s evaluation of Niger during 1994–
1995 did not change.   Niger remained categorized as “partly free” with a score of “3” in 
PR and “5” in CL.70  This scoring indicates that despite the demonstrated respect for 
democratic institutions during the crisis, democratic consolidation was not furthered 
during this period.  
After one false start and another coup, the military did return Niger to democracy 
in 1999.  MNSD chairman Mamadou Tandja was elected as President with 60 percent of 
the vote, in an election certified as free, fair, and transparent by international observers.  
MNSD took 38 of 83 seats National Assembly seats and its CDS allies took another 17 
seats, and together they took control of the government.  The PNDS headed the 
opposition with 16 seats, and two smaller parties, the Rassemblement pour la Démocratie 
et le Progrès (RDP) and Alliance Nigérienne pour la Démocratie et le Progrès (ANDP) 
took most of the rest. Tandja was reelected in 2004 in another free, fair, and transparent 
election and MNSD took 47 of 113 seats, its CDS allies 22 seats, and again controlled the 
government.  The opposition PNDS-led coalition held 25 seats, and again the smaller 
RDP, ANDP, Rassemblement Social Démocratique (RSD), and Parti pour le Socialisme 
et la Démocratie au Niger (PSDN) held the remaining 19 seats.  
As he neared the end of his second term, Tandja initiated a referendum to amend 
the constitution to eliminate term limits.  In May 2009, he announced a plan to extend his 
term in office by three years to allow time to pass the constitutional amendment, which 
would also introduce a fully presidential system of government.71  The opposition filed a 
complaint with the Constitutional Court, which ruled on May 25 that Tandja’s proposed 
 
70 Freedom House, “Comparative and Historical Data.”  
71 Reuters, “Niger to hold referendum despite court ruling,” June 28, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/ 
article/idUSLS45794220090628 (accessed March 14, 2010); Radio France Internationale, “Niger's Tandja 
said ready to "face consequences" of no-vote in August referendum,” July 29, 2009, through BBC 
Monitoring Africa–Political, July 29, 2009,  http://w3.nexis.com/new/ (accessed March 7, 2010); Radio 
France Internationale, “EU official urges Niger leader to return to constitutional order,” July 1, 2009, 
through BBC Monitoring Africa–Political, July 1, 2009, http://w3.nexis.com/new/ (accessed March 7, 
2010). 
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referendum was unconstitutional because Article 36, which stipulates that the President 
may only be reelected once, was not subject to revision.72  Within 24 hours, Tandja 
legally dissolved parliament.73  Protests against Tandja’s plan drew 20,000 people.74  
The ANDP and CDS, both previously allied with Tandja’s MNSD, came out against 
Tandja too.  Throughout June, unions protested and international donors and regional 
bodies issued criticisms.75  In late June, the Constitutional Court rejected a request from 
Tandja to review its earlier ruling, reaffirming its position that the proposed constitutional 
referendum was illegal.76  
Shortly thereafter, on June 26, Tandja dissolved the Constitutional Court (two 
months later, in August, he reinstated a newly appointed Constitutional Court with his 
own nominees), claiming that Article 53 of the constitution gave him the authority to do 
so.77  Article 53 allows the president exceptional powers when the institutions of 
government, national independence, territorial integrity, or the execution of international 
obligations are under “grave and immediate danger.” Since none of these conditions were 
present and the authority of Article 53 does not confer the ability to dissolve the 
 
72 Reuters, “Niger court says third-term referendum unlawful,” May 26, 2009, 
http://af.reuters.com/article/ nigerNews/idAFLQ4311320090526?feedType=RSS&feedName=nigerNews 
(accessed September 14, 2010); Constitution Of The Fifth Republic Of Niger, title III, art. 36. 
73 Reuters, “Niger's Tandja dissolves parliament,” May 26, 2009, http://af.reuters.com/article/ 
topNews/idAFJOE54P0EL20090526?feedType=RSS&feedName=topNews&pageNumber=1&virtual
BrandChannel=0 (accessed September 14, 2010). 
74 Reuters, “Niger's Tandja dissolves parliament.” 
75 Reuters, “Niger to hold referendum despite court ruling.” 
76 Reuters, “UPDATE 2-Niger president rules by decree after court snub,” May 26, 2009, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSLQ2439220090626 (accessed September 14, 2010). 
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Constitutional Court, but allows him to rule unilaterally to protect the integrity of the 
nation in times of great danger this constituted the first unequivocal violation of the rule 
law.  The opposition Front pour la Défense de la Démocratie (FDD) characterized 
Tandja’s actions as a coup and appealed to the army and police to refuse his orders.  
Eight MPs from the previously MNSD-allied CDS resigned from government, and 
members of Tandja’s own MNSD began to express opposition to the president’s 
actions.78  This suggests a continuing commitment among other political actors to the 
rule of law.   
On August 4, 2009, Tandja went ahead with the constitutional referendum, which 
was boycotted by the opposition.  The new constitution was reported to have been 
approved by 92.5 percent of voters, amidst allegations of fraud.79  The new constitution 
went into effect on August 18, eight days after a newly appointed Constitutional Court 
published the election results. 80  The most significant changes to the constitution 
included: Tandja was allowed to remain until a new election on December 22, 2009, and 
seek unlimited mandates thereafter; the president was made the “sole holder of executive 
power,” appointment five of nine Constitutional Court justices, naming the prime 
minister, and having full authority over the cabinet.   In short, all changes reinforced 
executive power vis-à-vis the legislature and courts, fundamentally weakening the 
democratic regime.  Couched as a solution to the political struggles of the past, the 
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amendments in fact transferred all real authority to the executive.  Opposition-led protests 
continued in Niamey, leading to clashes between police and protesters in several areas.81 
Parliamentary and municipal elections in October and December 2009 were 
boycotted by the opposition.  In the National Assembly the MNSD took 76 of 113 seats, 
with MNSD allies/co-opted parties taking the rest, with no opposition presence.82  
MNSD president Seyni Oumarou was elected President of the National Assembly by a 
unanimous vote of the 109 MPs in attendance.83  International actors continued to isolate 
the Tandja government.  In December, the Economic Community Of West African States 
(ECOWAS) attempted to negotiate between the Tandja government and the opposition, 
but made no progress.  The opposition CFDR called for mass mobilization.  Ten thousand 
protesters peacefully marched in Niamey on February 14, 2010, calling for Tandja to 
reverse the constitutional change.84  Political stalemate was again resolved by military 
intervention on February 18, 2010.85   
While initially the rule of law did prevail as the court was employed to adjudicate 
Tandja’s referendum plan, respect for the institution of the courts quickly fell by the 
wayside as they tried to check Tandja’s initiative.  Tandja actions grew increasingly 
despotic as he dissolved the courts and assumed emergency powers.  In reaction, the 
opposition, and some of those allied to, or within, his own party began to take up protest 
and boycotted the institutions of government in response to what they believed was in 
effect a constitutional coup made by Tandja.  Despite the boycott, Tandja pushed forward 
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with his agenda, amassed power according to the new constitution, rebuilt the courts with 
his appointments, and then took control the parliament and the municipalities through 
boycotted elections.  Protests and dissent continued, both internally and externally, but 
Tandja and the MSDN were not dissuaded.  It was only through a counter abrogation of 
the rule of law, in the form of a military coup, that Tandja’s efforts were halted.  
So while the constitutional courts were respected to a degree during the first 
crisis, they were completely run roughshod during the second.  The events of 2009 are 
correlated with a significant depreciation of political rights.  The evaluation of Niger, as 
offered by Freedom House, between 2008 and 2009 show a drop in the PR rating from 
“3” to “5.” 86  As appropriate to the abrogation of the rule of law and illegal 
constitutional reforms, democratic consolidation was negatively impacted during this 
period.  Among other problems, Freedom House’s critique of Niger’s drop in PR was 
attributed to “President Mamadou Tandja’s unconstitutional moves to extend his rule in 
2009 dismantled much of the country’s democratic progress.”87 
C. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
In both the Mali and Niger cases, it is readily apparent that among political parties 
the rule of law was respected throughout all the crises examined.  Election procedures 
and results for the most part were honored, and those that were contested were 
impartially arbitrated by the constitutional courts and all sides accepted the court’s 
rulings as binding.  Democratic institutions were employed for addressing grievances: 
cases were submitted to the courts; no-confidence votes were taken and respected; public 
protests were allowed to go forward and generally remained focused on pressuring 
governments peacefully; election boycotts were adopted over illegal responses to ongoing 
concerns of electoral irregularities. In short, contending parties engaged in political 
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equally respected, and equally effective, in Niger and Mali as the Constitutional Courts 
acted independently and political actors in and out of power accepted their rulings as 
binding.   
While Mali did not have any transgressions of the rule of law in its case, the few 
instances where it occurred in Niger were perpetrated by individuals.  The political 
jousting between Ousmane and Amadou certainly pushed the envelope on their 
authorities, in the form of issuing unilateral decrees and liberally interpreting the 
constitution self-interestedly.  As a consequence, the rule of law seemed less binding 
between individuals as both attempted to expand their powers for control of the state.  In 
Niger, Tandja abrogated the rule of law after the institutions of democracy attempted to 
regulate Tandja’s increasingly despotic attempts to amass control of the executive 
through an illegal constitutional reform.  He further trampled on the institutions of 
democracy as he re-formed a co-opted legislature and judiciary.  Interestingly, in the 
Niger case, one finds other actors, like those in the opposition and in the margins, who 
continued to adhere to the rule of law when it was challenged by the executive.  In 
several cases those in the legislature employed no-confidence votes and appealed to the 
courts for arbitration as a means to put violators in check.    
As for measuring democratic consolidation, in both Mali and Niger one finds 
either a negative impact or no impact according to Freedom House’s evaluation.  So 
while the rule of law might have held at times and democratic institutions respected, the 
handling of the crises themselves did nothing to enhance democratic consolidation in 
either case.  This suggests that to the extent to which respect for the rule of law occurred 
did not noticeably influence democratic consolidation.  The only obvious correlation 
occurred during the 2009 crisis in Niger where Tandja’s absolute disregard for law and 
the institutions of democracy align with a significant drop in Niger’s Freedom House 
ranking.   
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III. CIVIL SOCIETY 
Civil society is “the sphere of institutions, organizations and individuals located 
between the family, the state and the market, in which people associate voluntarily to 
advance common interests.”88  This chapter explores civil society’s respect for rule of 
law by examining the nature of Islamic organizations’ activism from the mid 1990s to 
late 2000s.   Islamic non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in both countries lobbied 
government regularly and vigorously on morality and family law.  These are ideal issues 
for study because government actors had little to gain or lose from the outcome of such 
legislative debates, and can therefore afford to be responsive to one set of societal 
interests or another.  If they legislate “progressive” social agendas they gain favor with 
the international community and most national women’s organizations; if they legislate 
more conservative laws advocated by national Islamic organizations they gain favor with 
broader local constituencies among their generally conservative populations.  The 
comparative analysis looks for how differences in respect for the rule of law by civil 
society has contributed to democratic survival and consolidation. 
Following their respective transitions to democracy, new constitutions were 
created that reaffirmed long standing commitments to secularism and prohibited 
religiously based political parties in both countries.  However, new freedoms of 
association and expression created an opening for Islamic civic organizations, among 
others, and these groups sought to bring Islamic principles to bear on national 
legislation.89 Between 1980 and1991 Mali had only one officially authorized Islamic 
association, the Association Malienne pour l’Unité et le Progrès de l’Islam (AMUPI).  
After 1990, one hundred and fifty national Islamic associations formed, alongside 
associations representing youth, women, and the poor.90  By 2000, twenty-one Islamic 
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NGOs had voluntarily registered with the government.91  This provided a variety of 
mobilization platforms for influencing the political environment.   In January 2002, the 
Haut Conseil Islamique du Mali (HCIM) was created by members of AMUPI to serve as 
an apolitical “interface” between the government of Mali and over a hundred Islamic 
groups and association.92  Similarly, in 1994 Niger had five official Islamic associations 
operating under the umbrella Association Islamique du Niger (AIN).  By 2000, this 
number had grown to forty, and by 2003 to fifty.93   
In both countries Islamic civic associations are often on both sides of a particular 
debate, reflecting the Islamic theology and practice in their societies.94  They are most 
“forcefully political” when united behind a single position on a particular social issue.95  
Islamic organizations took on similar agendas in the two countries, dealing with morality, 
women’s sexuality, and the family code.  In Mali Islamic organizations opposed anti-
excision campaigns on the grounds that the practice was a custom without which the 
family unit would be at risk.  In Niger Islamic civics opposed a government HIV/AIDS 
campaign that promoted condom use, on the grounds that it encouraged prostitution and 
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A. MALI 
In 1995, Islamic associations, with the backing of AMUPI, began to organize 
larger, more public forums to discuss and/or protest perceived encroachments on 
traditional Islamic values.96   Following the 1994 UN Population and Development 
conference in Cairo, which advocated the elimination of excision, or female 
circumcision, Islamic organizations organized pro-excision campaigns to counter the 
anti-excision influence of UN agencies, the Catholic Church, various bilateral donors and 
Malian NGOs, including Fatoumata Siré Diakité’s Association pour la Promotion et la 
Défense des Droits de la Femme and more liberal Islamic associations, such as Islamic 
Action, an association of Muslim intellectuals.  The debate over excision pitted this 
coalition of local and international NGO’s against a coalition of pro-excision local 
Islamic organizations.  While the campaign was led by religious organizations, excision 
has deep cultural roots in Mali and is widely considered an important component for 
maintaining the integrity of family.97   
Leaders of Islamic civic associations, including Mohammed Kimbiri, chief 
secretary of the Collectif des Associations Islamiques du Mali, in early 2001 argued that 
excision is a religiously justifiable practice that should be “medicalized” to improve its 
safety rather than banned.  The Association Islamique du Salat (AISLAM) undertook a 
public information leaflet campaign, distributing literature in mosques maintaining that 
the banning of excision would be an “attack on the freedom of religion.”98  This 
definition of the pro-excision campaign as an attack on constitutional freedoms itself 
demonstrates an embrace of democracy on the part of Islamic organizations.   The anti-
excision message as put forth by Muslim organizations de-emphasized religion.  Islamic 
Action, for example, insisted that “female circumcision has got nothing to do with 
religion.”99  While it is difficult to discern whether the anti-excision campaign was 
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responsible for this policy, it was perceived that way.  Moreover, it was perceived to have 
been achieved through the democratic practices of public discourse and information 
campaigns.  Freedom House’s evaluation of Mali in 2001 held that civil liberties, in the 
form of open political discourse and an open media, are largely respected, and was 
evaluated as a “3”: which was its consistent score from 1997–2002.100   
Following years of discussion and international pressure, in 1999 a concerted 
effort to reform the family code was initiated as part of Konaré’s larger ten-year program 
to reform the legal system, called Promotion de la Democratie et de la Justice au Mali 
(PRODEJ). 101  With the support of women’s rights activists and international donors, the 
government hosted a series of Concertations Regionales designed to create popular 
participation and buy-in to the reform.102  At the public debates in late 2000, Muslim 
clergy came out in opposition to the reform, citing a need to preserve Islamic values and 
resist Western imperialism.103  Nevertheless, in 2001 the Ministry for the Promotion of 
Women, Children and Family announced a proposal to change the existing 1963 Code du 
Mariage et de la Tutelle, reforming marriage and inheritance laws to create equity 
between the sexes.  The proposal then went to national debate for almost a year.104   
The proposed law received significant support from women’s associations, 
including the Association des Jurists Maliennes (AJM), Groupe-Pivot Droits des 
Femmes, Coordination des Associations et ONGs Feminines du Mali (CAFO), and 
Association pour le Progrès et la Defense des Droits de Femme Maliennes (APDF).105  It 
was opposed by Muslim associations organized under the umbrella Collectif des 
Associations Islamiques du Mali.  Outspoken Muslim leaders and government critics like 
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Imam Mahamoud Dicko, director of Bamako's Islamic Radio, publicly condemned the 
government’s proposal, arguing that marriage equality runs counter to Koranic text which 
demands a wife be obedient to her husband.106  Even Islamic women’s organizations 
protested the reform of the code.  While presiding over a meeting of more than two 
hundred delegates in the Union Nationale des Associations de Femmes Musulmanes en 
Afrique (UNAFEM), president Tahara Drave announced the UNAFEM’s official 
opposition to marriage provisions that were counter to Mali’s “social realities.” 107  The 
battle of the family law was one that was clearly taken on by the aforementioned civics in 
an attempt to influence public opinion; their dialogue demonstrated an acceptance among 
interest groups to leverage the instruments of democracy to affect legislative change.  As 
a result of this popular opposition and lawmaker ambivalence, as evidenced by 
lawmakers from rural areas who did not support family code reform as there was a lack 
of support within their constituencies, the bill was never brought to the floor of the 
National Assembly108  On his own initiative, during the twilight of his time in office in 
2002, President Konaré adopted the reform by decree. In response to this decree, the 
Collectif des Associations Islamiques du Mali mobilized vocal protests and threats of 
both violence and civil disobedience.  In response to this reaction, Konaré withdraw the 
decree weeks later.    
It is again difficult to discern to what extent Islamic civics contributed to the 
defeat of the family code, nevertheless, they were a vocal part of the campaign against it.  
Civic engagement on the family code demonstrated how the vocal majority’s will swayed 
government by killing the bill before it ever made it to the floor of the national assembly.  
While this was not without undemocratic incidents, including Konaré’s unilateral attempt 
to force the family code reform through by decree and the Collectif’s call for violence in 
response, overall, civic organizations dialogued, campaigned, and lobbied for both public 
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and government backing in support of their respective agendas.  The nature of the 
dialogue, the use of social mobilization, and the lobbying for legislative change, all 
ensured that Mali remained “free” according to Freedom House as Mali’s ratings during 
this period remained stable at a “2” for PR and “3” for CL consolidation of a 
representative democracy that is reflective of the vocal majority.  In Freedom House’s 
evaluation for 2003, Mali was praised for fostering an environment where “many civic 
groups and nongovernmental organizations, including human rights groups, operate 
without interference.”109  This was partly responsible for improving Mali’s CL score to 
“2.”  
The family code contestation did not lay dormant for long; in 2007 a group of 
women parliamentarians joined with lawyers and human rights activists in a second effort 
to revise it.110  After a slow start in which the debate was overshadowed by presidential 
and parliamentary elections, in January 2008 the Ministry of Justice established a 
nineteen-member commission to meet, review, and discuss the issue of an updated family 
law.111  During this time a draft code made its way past consultations with members of 
the religious community, designed to generate support, and up to parliament.  In August 
2009, a revised family code was passed in Parliament with 117 of 160 votes.112  Islamic 
organizations opposed to the reformed family code, including AISLAM, complained that 
the outcomes of the consultations with the religious community were ignored, and as a 
result the religious community was opposed to provisions regarding marriage, inheritance 
and property rights.  Mamadou Diamouténé, head of an Islamic group involved in the 
consultations, protested that without amendments to remove these provisions, the revised 
family code “would be an open road to debauchery.”113  HCIM also denounced these 
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provisions and the failure to heed the input of the religious community, calling for 
protests and civil disobedience, which ultimately led to violence.114  President Touré 
refused to sign the code into law saying that “door of debate is still open” and sent it back 
for revision of the contested articles, after which the HCIM called off demonstrations 
“until further notice.”115   
So while Islamic civics were certainly active in working against the family code, 
the only clear example of them directly influencing an outcome was when they 
threatened mass protests, civil disobedience, and violence in both 2002 and 2009.  
Freedom House did not seem to register this as it was not brought up in their assessments 
of Mali throughout the decade.   Mali remained relatively stable in its rating of “free”; it 
was evaluated as PR “2” and CL “3” from 2000–2002 and 2006–2009, with a brief period 
of improvement from 2003–2005 where CL improved to a “2.”   Thus the only 
measurable net effect of Islamic civic activism was the extent to which it contributed to 
maintaining Mali’s already “free” democracy.116 
Another formal attempt by civil society to influence government occurred in 2002 
when a powerful collective of twenty Muslim associations, not including the AMUPI, 
supported a presidential candidate for the first time.117  This collective targeted both the 
masses and religious leaders with radio broadcasts and Friday sermons, urging voters to 
support former prime minister Ibrahim Boubakar Keita, who was expected to give greater 
support to  Islamic law.118  While Keita only took 20.7 percent of the vote and did not 
advance to the second round, “the marabouts, imams, and almamys declared themselves 
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satisfied with this first, and unprecedented, sally into national politics.”119  This 
sentiment reflects an embrace made by Islamic civics of the processes and institutions of 
democracy.  By being satisfied that they can participate in the system, despite having lost, 
they appear to believe that is a system worth working in and supporting. 
Islamic civics in Mali took on contesting government policies with the tools 
ranging from debate and rhetoric to more unified social movements and civil contestation 
in an attempt to influence the state using the available apparatuses of democracy.  At 
times, the nature of this contestation threatened to undermine democratic consolidation as 
civic activism crossed the boundaries of legality when it threatened and employed 
violence.  Nonetheless civil society interactions influenced both popular support and 
Malian lawmakers through public information campaigns and social mobilization to push 
their respective agendas.  As already discussed, this last decade of democracy for Mali 
was ultimately a wash with no net gain or loss.  So while Islamic civics played their part 
in participating in open and public dialogue to advance their agenda, they also pushed the 
limits with threats of violence when it appeared they were not going to get their way.  
Beyond seeing that Islamic civics have not given up on using dialogue and public 
information campaigns to assert their will and that their efforts contributed to the 
maintenance of democracy, it does not appear that it truly consolidated democracy 
anymore than had already been established.   
B. NIGER 
Family law issues in Niger are governed simultaneously by civil code and 
customary law, which includes sharia (Islamic law), with customary law being 
preeminent.120  The tensions between the two sources of law have periodically received 
attention, as, for example, when women’s organizations in 1976 and 1987 tried, but 
failed, to formally codify family law.  In 1993, a draft family code bill, modeled on codes 
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used in other African Muslim states, was considered by the legislature.121  The bill had 
the backing of two major women’s associations, several human rights groups, and a 
number of international donors.  It allowed Nigeriens to choose between codified law and 
sharia in family law matters, and prohibited repudiation of wives.122  This provision 
dealing with repudiation of wives and rights of illegitimate children led all the official, 
recognized Islamic groups in Niger to join in lobbying against the bill at all levels from 
the village to the National Assembly.123  As part of this effort, six Islamic associations 
issued a communiqué calling for “all Niger Muslims, whoever they are, to mobilize 
themselves and ensure the failure through legal means of all attempts to impose this bill 
on the Niger people.”124  They maintained that 603 of 906 articles in the bill ran counter 
to Koranic teachings.  From the village level to the National Assembly, all officially 
recognized Islamic civic groups lobbied in unison to stop the legislation.125  While the 
effort was largely a civil public opinion/lobbying campaign, there were reports that 
Islamic militants threatened female supporters of the bill with physical harm.126  Due to 
the successful lobbying initiative, the bill was not even voted on.127   
In 1993–1994, eleven Islamic organizations thwarted a government condom 
distribution campaign aimed at both contraception and AIDS/HIV prevention.128  These 
groups accused the government of being anti-Islamic and mobilized demonstrators who 
 
121 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1994, “Africa: Niger,” through Contemporary 
Women's Issues, 1995,  http://w3.nexis.com/new/ (accessed October 12, 2010). 
122 Musawah initiative, “Home Truths: A Global Report on Equality in the Muslim Family,” Sisters in 
Islam (2009): 34–35, http://www.musawah.org/docs/pubs/home-truths/GR-EN.pdf (accessed October 18, 
2010). 
123 Radio France Internationale, “Islamic groups attempt to sabotage contraceptive campaign,” 
November 18, 1994, through BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, November 21, 1994, 
http://w3.nexis.com/new/ (accessed September 5, 2010); Charlick, “African Studies Review Focus: 
Islamism in West Africa,” 101. 
124 Voix du Sahel, “Six Islamic associations call on all Niger Muslims to oppose draft family bill,” 
May 20, 1994, through BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, May 23, 1994, http://w3.nexis.com/new/ 
(accessed October 12, 2010); emphasis added. 
125 Charlick, “Niger: Islamist Identity and the Politics of Globalization,” 29 
126 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1994, “Africa: Niger,” through Contemporary 
Women's Issues, 1995,  http://w3.nexis.com/new/ (accessed October 12, 2010). 
127 Charlick, “Niger: Islamist Identity and the Politics of Globalization,” 29; Musawah initiative, 34–
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y ratifying the convention with significant reservations that ensured all issues regarding 
                                                
disrupted training programs and conferences associated with the family-planning 
campaign.129  In November 1994, approximately two hundred activists disrupted a 
family planning conference with “violent words, insults, shouting, slogans: Allahu 
Akbar.”130  Their primary grievance was that the use of condoms “encourages 
prostitution and debauchery.”131  Several demonstrations and a large prayer session at the 
Grand Mosque in Niamey against the government’s campaign were also held.132  
Members of the Islamic organizations also tore down or damaged posters and advertising 
stockpiles.133  These efforts resulted in the suspension of government mass media efforts 
to promote the use of condoms.134  These early successes for Niger’s Islamic 
organizations were largely based on civil activism, with occasional instances of material 
destruction and disruptive efforts to stifle opposing civic organizations.  As in Mali, 
Islamic organizations were able to generate social pressure to block change using the 
democratic tools of dialogue and public information campaigns to generate socia
ation in support of their agenda. 
Niger’s Islamic organizations also had a string of successes lobbying against 
ratification of various international charters with family code implications. The first was 
the 1999 campaign against ratification of the UN Convention on Ending All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women.  Islamic organizations organized a robust public 
information and legislative lobbying campaign to add reservations on the ratification of 
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rights and obligations of married women were regulated by “custom and tradition.”136  
Islamic civic associations led protests that resulted in the rejection of ratification of the 
Additional Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights in 2006 (in 
opposition to a provision that would have raised the legal age of marriage to eighteen 
 
136 “Reservations: 
        Article 2, paragraphs (d) and (f) 
         The Government of the Republic of the Niger expresses reservations with regard 
to article 2, paragraphs (d) and (f), concerning the taking of all appropriate measures to abolish all customs 
and practices which constitute discrimination against women, particularly in respect of succession. 
        Article 5, paragraph (a) 
         The Government of the Republic of the Niger expresses reservations with regard 
to the modification of social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women. 
        Article 15, paragraph 4 
         The Government of the Republic of the Niger declares that it can be bound by 
the provisions of this paragraph, particularly those concerning the right of women to choose their residence 
and domicile, only to the extent that these provisions refer only to unmarried women. 
        Article 16, paragraph 1 (c), (e) and (g) 
         The Government of the Republic of the Niger expresses reservations concerning 
the above-referenced provisions of article 16, particularly those concerning the same rights and 
responsibilities during marriage and at its dissolution, the same rights to decide freely and responsibly on 
the number and spacing of their children, and the right to choose a family name. 
         The Government of the Republic of the Niger declares that the provisions of 
article 2, paragraphs (d) and (f), article 5, paragraphs (a) and (b), article 15, paragraph 4, and article 16, 
paragraph 1 (c), (e) and (g), concerning family relations, cannot be applied immediately, as they are 
contrary to existing customs and practices which, by their nature, can be modified only with the passage of 
time and the evolution of society and cannot, therefore, be abolished by an act of authority. 
        Article 29 
         The Government of the Republic of the Niger expresses a reservation 
concerning article 29, paragraph 1, which provides that any dispute between two or more States concerning 
the interpretation or application of the present Convention which is not settled by negotiation shall, at the 
request of one of them, be submitted to arbitration. 
         In the view of the Government of the Niger, a dispute of this nature can be 
submitted to arbitration only with the consent of all the parties to the dispute. 
Declaration 
        The Government of the Republic of the Niger declares that the term "family education" 
which appears in article 5, paragraph (b), of the Convention should be interpreted as referring to public 
education concerning the family, and that in any event, article 5 would be applied in compliance with 
article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.”  United Nations, Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, December 18, 1979, Chapter IV, Section 8. 
http://treaties.un.org /pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-8&chapter=4&lang=en 
(accessed September 5, 2010); Charlick, “African Studies Review Focus: Islamism in West Africa,” 100; 
UN, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. 
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onstrations that were 
critical
     
from fifteen) and the African Union Protocol on Women's Rights in 2007.  In July and 
November 2006, Muslim activists gathered in protest of the African Union Protocol 
citing incompatibility with Islamic law, but were dispersed by police.  The ratification 
bill was briefly tabled, but there were further anti-ratification protests by several Muslim 
women’s associations in Niamey.137  Ultimately, the ratification bill was rejected.  The 
net effect of these various successful political engagements was the reinforcement of 
democratic action as a means to promote the agendas of Islamic civics.  This was noticed 
by Freedom House who praised Niger respecting its constitutional provisions for free 
expression and freedom of assembly and association.  Specifically, Freedom House noted 
there was a gradual improvement in the government allowing dem
 of the government contingent upon them being peaceful.138  
Islamic civics did not always act within the parameters of the law.  While 
peaceful protests were held at the 1999 Festival International de la Mode Africaine 
(FIMA) near Agadez, similar protests during the 2000 FIMA, near Niamey, turned 
violent and spread beyond FIMA.   Jama'at Izalatil Bidiawa Iqamatus Sunnah 
(Movement against Negative Innovations and for Orthodoxy) or Izala, was the primary 
group in violent opposition, but it was joined by Adini Islam, the Association pour le 
Rayonnement de la Culture Islamique (ARCI), and the Association des Etudiants 
Musulmans à l’Université de Niamey (AEMUN).139  Protestors maintained that the event 
was contrary to Muslim religious practice, with women appearing in varied states of 
undress, and some FIMA attendees being openly homosexual.140  Protests started with a 
march on the National Assembly.  As the festival went on, protestors moved into Niamey 
                                            
137 U.S. Department of State, 2006 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – Niger, (March 6, 
2007), http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2006/78750.htm (accessed August 20, 2010)
of State, 2007 Report on International Religious Freedom – Niger, (September 20
; U.S. Department 
07), 
http 10). 
eedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=363&year=2007&country=7243 (accessed November 25, 
201
hion Festival,” Inter 
l/Categories/Culture/ 
cul0
://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/ 2007/90113.htm (accessed August 20, 20
138 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2007, chapter on “Niger,” 
http://fr
0). 
139 Saidou Arji and Noel Tadegnon, “Niger bans Islamic groups opposed to Fas
Press Service, November 18, 2000, http://www.afrol.com/htm
10_niamey_fashion.htm (accessed September 5, 2010). 
140 Arji and Tadegnon, “ Niger bans Islamic groups opposed to Fashion Festival.” 
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 largely civil mobilizations undertaken 
by Islam
                                                
neighborhoods, attacking prostitutes and women in short skirts.141  Izala led attacks on 
bars, brothels, hotels, guest houses, and churches in Maradi.142  Protestors attempted to 
burn the Iya of Maradi, a pre-Islamic female ritual figure.143   The violence surrounding 
FIMA was not a representation of all Islamic organizations, as most did not support the 
violent actions of Izala et al.  Whether opposed to the use of violence or to protesting 
FIMA or both, more moderate groups, like the AIN, called for tolerance and calm as the 
“teachings of Islam forbid attacks on other people's property.”144  While violence of the 
FIMA protests did nothing to consolidate democratic institutions of civic mobilization, it 
was, in the grand scheme, uncharacteristic of the
ic organizations to pursue their agendas.  
Political Islam in Niger quickly found the utility in confederated social 
movements that attempted to influence the state using the available apparatuses of 
democracy.  Unfortunately in some instances the nature of this contestation threatened to 
undermine democratic consolidation as civic contestation flirted with the boundaries of 
legality when at least one series of protests moved beyond civil and turned violent.  
Nonetheless Islamic organizations proved successful in pursuing their agendas through 
public information campaigns and social mobilization to pressure lawmakers to respond 
in favor to the Islamic agenda.  While Niger was at best characterized as “partly free” 
throughout the decade of 2000, it did make some gradual improvements in its CL score.  
In 1999 its CL was rated at “5,” this improved to “4” from 2000–2003, and further 
improved to “3” from 2005–2007.145  While in 2008 it slipped back to “4” this was 
because of the government restricting freedom of expression in an attempt to control 
media coverage of the Tuareg conflict in the North.146  Thus the peaceful actions of 
 
141 Arji and Tadegnon, “ Niger bans Islamic groups opposed to Fashion Festival.” 
142 Charlick, “African Studies Review Focus: Islamism in West Africa,” 100. 
143 Charlick, “African Studies Review Focus: Islamism in West Africa,” 100. 
144 Arji and Tadegnon, “ Niger bans Islamic groups opposed to Fashion Festival.” 
145 Freedom House, “Comparative and Historical Data.”  
146 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2008, chapter on “Niger.” 
http://freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&year=2008&country=7460 (accessed November 25, 
2010). 
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emocracy making public civic-government 
dialogu
ation campaigns and social mobilization as they pushed 
their respective agendas.  Freedom House’s evaluation does not support that this 
strength
o 
respond to their demands.  While still only “partly free,” Freedom house noted an 
Islamic civics was reflective of furthering d
e through protest and public information an acceptable tool of discourse.   
C. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
The question repeated throughout the discussion was, were Islamic civics 
perceived to be effective with their activism and were they civil/law abiding in their 
attempts to promote their agendas, and did the nature of their activism contribute to 
democratic consolidation?  In Mali, one finds Islamic civics contesting government 
policies with tools ranging from debate and rhetoric to more unified social movements 
and civil contestation.  At times, when their engagement seemed ineffective, their action 
came close to undermining democratic consolidation as civic contestation flirted with the 
boundaries of legality when Islamic civics threatened violence.  While it never truly came 
to violence, the extent to which civics operated within the confines of the law is difficult 
to establish because they came close to crossing over the boundaries of legality.  
Nevertheless civil society interactions influenced both popular opinion and Malian 
lawmakers through public inform
ened democracy, but it does suggest that it helped maintain what had already 
been established.   
Likewise, political Islam in Niger quickly found the utility in confederated social 
movements that attempted to influence the state using the available apparatuses of 
democracy.  In some instances the nature of this contestation threatened to undermine 
democratic consolidation as civic contestation crossed the boundaries of legality during 
two notable campaigns against the 1993–1994 government condom initiative and the 
2000 FIMA event, moving beyond civil and either engaged in material destruction, 
and/or turned violent.  These notable exceptions aside, Islamic civics in Niger still 
maintained a credible history of successfully pursuing their agendas though through 
public information campaigns and social mobilization that pressured lawmakers t
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 as unIslamic, instead embraced the 
democratic game to block change.   This was as much in evidence in Niger, despite the 
repeated collapse of democratic regimes, as in Mali.  Therefore, the nature of civic 
activism, as a manifestation of political culture, does not help to explain the variation in 
democratic stability between the two countries.  
improving relationship between Niger’s civics and the Niger government throughout the 
2000s, as peaceful protests grew more common and more accepted by the government.  
The analysis above demonstrates striking similarities in the two cases.  In both 
countries Islamic civic organizations were largely civil and quite effective in advancing 
their interests; with notable exceptions.  They not only engaged the government but they 
engaged other civic organizations in both dialogue and social mobilization, be it women’s 
groups, humanitarian groups, or other Islamic organizations who did not view situations 
with a universal Islamic lens.  What is perhaps most striking is that Islamic organizations, 
which might have rejected liberal democracy
 42
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IV. CONCLUSION 
This thesis tested the hypothesis that different levels of social capital (IV), acting 
through two separate causal pathways, explain the divergent outcomes in democratic 
consolidation (DV) in Mali and Niger.  The first causal pathway is a greater inclination 
among Malian political actors and parties to adhere to the rule of law, engage in 
consensus politics, and accept rulings of the constitutional courts (IntV1).  The second 
causal pathway is a greater inclination among Malian civil society actors to engage the 
democratically elected government within the limits of the law (InvtV2).  The evidence 
however, suggests something different.  There is a remarkable parallel in the behavior of 
political and civil actors in the two countries, which invalidates the hypotheses. 
If the rule of law was upheld by the parties and institutions, and in the few cases it 
was not was due to the actions of key individuals, what does this say for the first causal 
pathway?  It suggests that either the level of social capital is similar in the two cases, or 
that it does not act through the hypothesized causal pathway.   
As already mentioned, Smith, Vanhanen, and Pringle suggested that Mali has a 
“unique political culture” which predisposed it to take a positive track towards 
democratization.  Unfortunately, they say nothing of Niger and according to the findings 
of this thesis, social capital between Mali and Niger does not seem too divergent.  In 
support of  parallel social capital, it is Pringle, whose argument credits Mali’s 
democratization to a heritage of tolerance and tradition of decentralized government, that 
suggests that Mali’s history and culture is not all that unique, and that Niger, along with 
four other West African neighbors, has similar cultural factors that could have set it on a 
path of democratization, but either bad history, bad geography, and bad leadership have 
intervened in a way that negated Niger’s democratically inclined culture.147  With 
geography and history being fairly similar, Pringle’s reasoning would leave leadership as 
the culprit. 
 
147 Pringle, 53–57. 
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On the other hand, if social capital is not equal, then the hypothesized pathway is 
flawed, suggesting that the rule of law does not serve as the appropriate intervening 
variables that influence democratic consolidation.  Regardless of the state of social 
capital in both cases, tolerance among parties and institutions for the rule of law was 
parallel, and does not explain a divergence on democratic stability and consolidation.    
A similar conclusion can be made about the second causal pathway, that social 
capital works through civil society to affect democratic consolidation. Both the cases of 
Niger and Mali demonstrate a remarkable similarity in the nature of their respective civil 
societies.  While there were occasions of less than civil behavior and material destruction 
at the hands of protestors, in both Mali and Niger civil society action was often enough 
within the acceptable confines of democracy if not always the law.  In addition, civics 
were effective in the sense they were able to advance their interests through dialogue and 
social mobilization.  Furthermore, in both cases Freedom House’s evaluation was not 
drastically different: in Mali the status quo was maintained; and in Niger it improved only 
slightly.   Thus, an active civil society does not seem to determinate democratic 
consolidation for the cases examined.  Like rule of law, social capital appears equal and 
is producing a similar outcome.  Either social capital does not serve as the independent 
variable or the causal pathway does not operate as suggested.  Are there any hints in the 
analysis that might explain this divergence? 
Going back to Pringle’s analysis, perhaps leadership has played a role.  Within the 
story told, one picks up suggestions that individuals might have been the intervening 
variables affecting democratic consolidation.  Thus, the influence of individuals on the 
consolidation of democracy is worthy of further exploration, as there is something 
indicating that “good guys” like Konaré and Touré may have had a part to play in 
encouraging the forthright application of the rule of law, as they accepted rulings that ran 
counter to their agendas.  Conversly, in Niger key individuals made choice at critical 
junctures, as “bad guys” like Ousmane, Amadou, and Tandja, who, to varying degrees, 
engaged in actions that were arguably illegal as they ran counter to the respective Niger 
constitutions, may have had a part in encouraging the abandonment of the rule of law.  
The notable dueling between Ousmane and Amadou, who both pushed the envelope on 
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authorities in an attempt to redefine the roles of president and prime minister in a fashion 
that supported their own interests.  And the boldness of Tandja who trampled the 
Constitution of Niger in an attempt to restructure the regime in a fashion that transferred 
executive power to the presidency and discarded term limits that would have prevented 
Tandja from enjoying the power he created, these key Nigeriens did little to support the 
unsurpassed arbitration of the rule of law.  Instead, the leaders themselves where 
responsible for bypassing institutions that where generally respected by the parties privy 
to the democratic process.  
These individuals appear to have influenced democratic consolidation by the way 
their choices affected the trajectories of their respective countries.  In Mali, we find 
leaders who bowed to dialogue and compromise when political wrestling seemed like it 
was stressing the seams of democracy.  In Niger, conversely, the “playing for keeps” of 
key leaders was not deescalated.  Instead we find key leaders who refused to give up 
power when contestation climaxed.  This refusal to back down, or submit to democratic 
dialogue and compromise, at critical junctures was most detrimental to Niger itself.  In 
both cases, it was only resolved by the desperate choices of outside actors in the military.  
It was not dialogue and compromises that saw the day through and strengthened 
democracy, but it was coups that hit the reset button, and gave Niger yet another chance 
to reforge democracy.  
Likewise, for civil society in Mali, the individual influence of Konaré and Touré 
during Mali’s family code debate played a part in peacefully defusing contestation.  It is 
hard to discount the eleventh hour actions of Konaré in reversing his family code decree 
in 2002 to appease Islamic civics.  Konaré unilaterally forced family code reform, but 
backed down after evoking the ire of Islamic civics who called for (but did not take to) 
violence.  Touré too stopped legislation by refusing to sign a family code bill that was 
passed in Parliament.  This potential reform of the family code sparked public 
mobilization, headed by Islamic civics, and created significant uproar, which in a few 
cases did involve protestors and police clashing.  So while civics certainly played a role 
publicly advancing their agenda, it was not without the mediating influence of key 
leaders who made their mark on the nature of Mali’s democracy.   
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cy.  
                                                
The most likely alternative explanation is that articulated in the existing literature: 
the role of key individuals.  This follows in line with the argument of Pringle and 
Moestrup.  Pringle, as previously stated, believes that the lack of democracy may have 
been the result of “bad leadership.”  Similarly, Moestrup argues that since both Niger and 
Mali have a similar lack of economic development, turbulent political histories, and 
economic and societal preconditions, the reason for their divergent trajectories is found in 
both institutional choices (electoral systems) and key leaders during transition.148   
Moestrup’s analysis ends before 1999, but she does place heavy emphasis on key leaders 
like Konaré, whose efforts were conducive to keeping democracy alive in Mali, and 
Ousmane, Amadou, and Issoufou, whose political wrestling brought Niger to its 
knees.149  It seems likely that Moestrup would place Touré and Tandja with their 
respective countrymen and suggest that they too were most responsible for the way crises 
were resolved and whether that crisis strengthened or weakened democra
What then does this suggest for the study of democracy?  The argument presented 
does little to advance the role of social capital in democratic consolidation.  Additionally, 
the effects of the rule of law and civil society are equally unclear, as the nature of both 
rule of law and civil society in both Mali and Niger were parallel, but the outcome of 
democratic consolidation was divergent.  What has already been suggested is that the 
story told lends some credence to the influence of individuals, as key leaders seemed to 
have the most profound effect on democratic consolidation in both Mali and Niger. 
So for Mali and Niger the suggestion is that future research should explore these 
critical junctures for insight into the decision making calculi of the key actors.  The role 
of leaders, both “good” ones and “bad” ones is worthy of exploration.  While not 
comparatively, Baudais and Sborgi, in separate works, together attributed democratic 
trajectories to among other things, the role of politicians.  Moestrup, as previously 




148 Moestrup, 171. 
149 Moestrup, 180–182. 
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simultaneously looking at divergent electoral systems.  An approach that might provide 
more clarity would be one that isolates leaders as the independent variable, and does so 
within a comparative framework. 
For the larger body of literature concerning democracy in Africa, much of the 
focus is on the nature of African economics of African political systems and institutions.  
More could be done to explore how individuals influence democracy.  Is there any basis 
to suggest that “good guys” and “bad guys” can make the difference in influencing the 
trajectory of democracy?  Are critical junctures in the political history of Africa really a 
result of economics and institutions, or is it a result of big-men who make selfish or 
selfless decisions to usurp or submit to democracy? 
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